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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
C.A.RL XEI..JSON DAY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellant, 
J. GEORGE JONES, JR., and 
~IRS. J. GEORGE JONES, Jr., 
his wife, whose true and correct 
name is otherwise unknown, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 7 46G 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the District 
Court of 1\Iillard County, Utah, Ron. Will L. Hoyt, 
Judge presiding. The judgment of the trial court dis-
missed this action against the defendant, Mrs. George J~ 
Jones, Jr.; ·and awarded judgment against the defend-
ant, .J. George Jones, Jr., for the sum of $1.00 and costs. 
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Plaintiff by his complaint seeks compensatory and 
exemplary damages for the alleged conversion of wheat. 
The statement of facts in plaintiff's brief encom-
passes more of his contentions than of actual facts. Re-
spondents will therefore first state the facts of the case 
and then point out to the Court some of the pertinent 
misstatements of appellant. It is believed this will be 
more coherent and will minimize confusion. 
For clarity it should be here noted that this case is 
the outgrowth of a previous case (Day v. Jones, 112 Utah 
286, 187 Pac. (2d) 181, Case No. 7062) wherein this plain-
tiff was plaintiff, and these defendants were defendants. 
On or about May 22nd, 1940, plaintiff purchased cer-
tain real property in l\!illard County, Utah, (Finding No. 
1, ~ecord Pages 46-47). 
On or about May 28th, 1943, the defendant J. George 
Jones, Jr., procured a quit claim deed to said preniises 
from Millard County, (Finding No. 2, ~ecord Page 47). 
To avoid repitition of names, except as hereinafter other-
wise noted, the defendant, J. George Jones, Jr., will be 
denominated the· defendant, and "There ,his 'vife is re · 
ferred to it will be specified. 
Some three years later, and on or about July 15th, 
l~J16, plaintiff commenced action to quiet title to the 
said premises against the defendants, and summons was 
served (Finding No. 3, Record Page 47). 
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- Before the said action 'Yns tried and determined, and 
in the fall of 1946, the said defendant prepared the prem-
ises for planting and planted a crop of wheat thereon. 
(Finding No.4, Record Page .:17). 
After such planting of grain the case came on for 
trial. The said defendant raised the issue of reimburse-
ment for improvements made, including the planted crdps 
hereinbefore mentioned, and for other expenditures. On 
~Iareh 12th, 1946, the trial court made and entered find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law and a decree quieting 
title whereby the trial court determi~ed and adjudged 
that plaintiff was the owner of and entitled to the imme-
diate possession of the said lands and premises, and the 
improvements made thereon including the said, growing 
crop of wheat. The matter of the rights and claims of 
the defendant against the plaintiff in the lands and im-
provements, inc-luding the growing crop of wheat, was 
presented to the trial court for determination in the trial 
of said acj:ion and was litigated. (Findings Nos. 5, 6 and 
7, Record Page 47). 
The defendant perfected an appeal to this Court, and 
desiring to remain in possession of the said premises 
pending the appeal applied to the trial court for a stay 
of execution. The trial court affixed the amount of the 
supersedeas bond, increased later on application of 
plaintiff, the bond was filed, and a stay of execution was 
entered and remained in full force and effect thereafter. 
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It is to be noted that the trial court in this action also 
found ''That the said defendant, J. George Jones, Jr., 
after the entry of the decree aforesaid, remained in pos-
session of the said premises under and by virtue of an 
order made by said trial_ court >)(< * * ; that prior to and 
after the making of said order staying exe.cution, no 
process of any kind issued in said cause under which the 
plaintiff was ordered placed in possession of said prem-
ises, or under which said defendant was deprived of the 
possession thereof." (Finding No. 11, Record Page 49). 
Prior to the commencement of the action to quiet 
title said defendant was in possession of the premises 
and remained in possession while said action was pend-
ing. About three days after the trial court eNtered its 
decree quieting title the plaintiff, without having applied 
for or procured from anyone any process placing him in 
possession o.f the premises, went on the property in the 
temporary absence of the ·defendant and his representa-
tive, no one -excepting the plaintiff being present, ob-
served the condition of the crops growing on the land, 
made some minor repairs to the fence and observed that 
some of the ditches were filled up; that four days later 
he again went on the land and was repairing fences; that 
defendant's representative approached him, and told 
him there were instructions to keep him off the land; at 
that time the said representatives were ·Carrying pitch-
forks and 'vere belligerent in attitude. The plaintiff 
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thereupon left the prope:rty. The plaintiff was not eject-· 
ed or removed from the premises, unless the above con-
stituted an ejectment, and thereafter defendant remained 
in possession until the case 'Yas determined by this Court. 
(Finding No. 8, Record Page 47). 
In July of 1947 the defendant harvested and sold the 
crops. (Finding No.9, Record Page· No. 48). This Court 
decided the appeal on November 24th, 1947, _a re~ittitur 
issued December 16th, 1947, and about the same time de-
fendant gave up possession. (Findings Nos. 12 and 8,_ 
Record Pages 48-49). 
''The said crop of wheat had a fluctuating market 
value; that said crop had a peak or high market value 
of $2.55 per bushel, or a total value of $6,078.38, on or 
about the 24th day of January, 1948." (Finding No. 10, 
Record Page 48). 
"That the defendant .J. George Jones, Jr., was and 
is not guilty of any evil motive or malicious_ conduct 
either in the pursuing of his appeal to· the Supreme Court 
as aforesaid, or in procuring a stay of execution, or in 
remaining in possession of said premises pending such 
appeal, or in the harvesting and disposal of said crop of 
grain." (Finding No. 13, Record Page 49). 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence in the -case, 
each defendant separately moved the trial court to grant 
the plaintiff judgment against each of them for such nom-
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inal damages as .he might see fit and for costs of court, 
or in alternative, an order of non-suit. 
The trial court dismissed the action as against the 
wife, and awarded judgment against the defendant J. 
George Jones, Jr., for $1.00 and costs of court. 
As we observed at the outset of this statement of 
facts, it was necessary for respondents to make a detailed 
statement because the plaintiff's statement of fact in his 
brief is argumentative, contrary to the record in the case, 
and in many instances confuses the allegations of his 
complaint and his conte~tions with the facts in the case. 
He also sets· forth in great detail many facts encompassed 
within the previous case, and which ·are immaterial to a 
determination of this action. 
It is not particularly material or important, but at 
Page 7 of plaintiff's brief he stated as a fact that ''de-
fendants, by and through their agents and employees, did 
belligerently and by show of force eject and remove the 
plaintiff from his lands and preDJises and did re-enter 
and 'resume' possession thereof," whereas this ·is con-
trary to Finding :No. 8 of the trial court, (Record Page 
48). Defendant also urges that the defendant did not 
''reassume possession.'' On the contrary, the defendant 
J. George Jones, Jr., was never legally ousted .or out of 
possession. 
Plaintiff, commencing with the paragraph at the bot-
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tom of Pag·e 8 of his brief, states that "All of the actions 
of the said defendants relating to the said crop of grain 
were 'vi.llful, "'"rongful, malicious, unlawful, fraudulent, 
,vith full knowledge in them of the plaintif's ownership 
of and claim to the said land and the said crop, with full 
knowledge in them of the commencement of the said 
action, of the pendency thereof and of the judgment and 
decree of the court therein, 'vith wanton disregard of 
the plaintiff's rights therein, 'vithout the consent of the 
plaintiff or any rig·htful authority whatever, without 
good faith, but with evil intention to take unconscientious 
advantage of the plaintiff (Transcript p. 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 
17, and 44) . " 
The trial court found to the contrary as follows : 
"That the defendant J. George Jones, Jr., was 
and is not guilty of any evil motive or malicious 
conduct either in the pursuing of his appeal to the 
Supreme Court as aforesaid, or in procuring a stay 
of execution, or in remaimng in possession of said 
premises pending- such appeal, or in the harvesting 
and disposal of said crop of grain.,-, (Finding No. 
13, R\ecord Page 49.) / 
Plaintiff also states as a fact that he has been dam-
aged in the gross amount for which the grain was sold 
and f~r $3",000.00 exemplary damages, (Page 9, Plain-
tiff's Brief), whereas this was the very question to be 
determined by the trial court and is the very question 
now to be determined bv this Honorable Court. 
of -
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PREI.JIMINARY STATEMENT 
The plaintiff in his brief has ignored the basis and 
the grounds upon which the trial court predicated its 
dismissal as to the defendant wife and its judgment for 
$1.00 and costs against the defendant, J. George Jones, 
Jr. · Defendants believe this case will be more readilv 
oi 
understood by this Court if we first present the ques-
tions as they were presented to and ruled on by the trial 
court, and then discuss the ''Points for Reversal'' as they 
are raised by the plaintiff. 
The ultimate question before this Court for determi-
nation is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the 
action as to 1\frs. J. George Jones, Jr., and erred in 
awarding plaintiff nominal damages against J. George 
Jones, Jr. 
The real question respecting Mrs. J. George Jones, 
Jr., is whether or not the record discloses any basis of 
liability against her. 
The real question . respecting J .. George Jones, Jr., 
IS: Is the plaintiff, under the facts and circumstances 
of this case, entitled to recover the highest fluctuating 
market value of the wheatf And is he entitled to exemp· 
lary. damages f Defendant J. George Jones, Jr., may 
argue that the true measure of damages is ''the value of 
the use and occupation of the property from the time of 
the appeal until the delivery of possession thereof, not 
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exceeding the amount of the undertaking in that regard~' 
as fixed by the supersedeas bond; or he might argue 
that the true measure of damages is the value of the use 
and occupation of ~aid land (rental value) without re-
gard to the statute respecting supersedeas bonds or the 
terms thereof; or he might argue that the true measure 
of damag·es is the sale price of the wheat, less the costs 
(from the entry of the decree quieting title) of cultiva-
tion, irrigation, harvesting, cost or reasonable value of 
providing water, since there was no "\Vater 'vith the land; 
or he might argue some other basis. It is not necessary 
for this Court to determine what the true measure of 
damages might be. The sole question for determination 
is: Is plaintiff entitled to recover the highest fluctuating . 
price, and is he entitled to exemplary damages~ 
POINTS FOR ARGUl\IENT 
A. The trial court properly dismissed the action as 
to Mrs. J. George Jones, Jr., there being nothing in the 
record disclosing any basis for liability against her. 
B. Plaintiff was not entitled to recover the highest 
fluctuating peak or market value of the crop of wheat. 
C. The trial court properly awarded judgment for 
nominal damages against J. George Jones, Jr. 
D. Defendants' answer to plaintiff's ''Points for Re-
versal,'' the plaintiff's points being as follows: 
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.1. Possession of premises by defendants at 
time crop harvested immat~rial as defendants' 
rights and claims in crop were res judicata. 
2. Possession of premises by defendants at 
time crop harvested immaterial as defendants' 
rights and claims in crop were barred by statute. 
3. Possession of premises by defendants at 
time crop harvested immaterial as defendants' 
rights and claims in crop were lost and barred by 
plaintiff's taking possession of premises while crop 
growing thereon. 
4. Effect of supersedeas bond is solely to stay 
enforcement of judgment and does not nullify, void 
or suspend the judgment. 
5. Action in trover for conversion or in nature 
of action on the case. 
6. Disposal of subject of action pending appeal 
is contempt of both trial and appellate courts. 
8. Plaintiff entitled to exemplary damages by 
reason of the willful, wanton, malicious and 'vrong-
ful nature of defendants' actions. 
ARGUl\fENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED 
THE ACTION AS TO MRS. J. GEORGE JONES, JR., 
THERE BEING NO B A S I S FOR LIABILITY 
AGAINST HER DISCLOSED BY THE RECORD. 
This point will be disposed of very briefly. Neither 
the record in the case of Day v. Jones, 112 Utah 286, 187 
P_ac. ( 2d) 181, Case No. 7062, nor the record in this case 
discloses that Mrs. J. George Jones, Jr., was in any way 
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invoh~ed in buying- the lnnd from l\fillard County, Utah, 
in farming the crop or SlJlling the \\Theat. Plaintiff wishes 
to predicate liability as to her merely because she was 
the "-ife of the defendant, tT. George Jones, Jr. It is 
true that her name is mentioned in the supersedeas bond 
filed pending appeal in the other case and if liability had 
been predicated on the supersedea~ bond then she would 
have incurred liability, limited, '"'e contend to the amounts 
of the bonds, and based upon liability for use and occu-
pation of the premises as specified in the bond. Plaintiff 
in this case doP.s not set forth a cause of action based 
upon use and occupation, nor are any damages proved 
from which an a'Yard against her might be made on that 
basis. On the basis of conversion J\!Irs. J.· George Jones, 
Jr., took no action 'Yhatever and incurred no liability. 
PLAINTIF:B., \~VAS NOT ENTITLED TO RE-
COVER THE I-IIGHEST FijUCTUATING PEAK OR 
1IARKET VALUE OF THE CROP OF WHEAT. 
Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to recover the 
highest peak or market value of the crop of wheat. De-
fendant contends that he is liable only for the value of 
the use and occupation of the land with growing crops 
thereon from the time of the entry of the decree quieting 
title to the time when he relinquished possession, limited 
ho,vever to the amount of the supersedeas bond (later an 
additional bond was required and furnished) ; or, disre-
garding the amount of the supersedeas bond, that his lia-
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bility is limited to such use and occupation. 
Ther-e is one case, and one alone, in the entire Pacific 
jurisdiction which is flatly in point. It is the compara-
tively recent case of Amberg v. Claussen, 98 Pac. (2d) 927. 
The facts in the Amberg v. Claussen case are prac-
tically identical with the facts in the case at bar. In that 
case the defendant acquired a tax title to land thereto-
fore owned by plaintiff; the plaintiff commenced an 
action to set the tax ti tie aside; the trial court cancelled 
the tax deeds and awarded possession of the premises to 
plaintiff; the defendant appealed from that portion of 
the judgment cancelling the tax title and awarding pos-
session of the premises to plaintiff. The. defendant exe-
cuted and filed a supersedeas bond and execution was 
stayed; thereafter the judgment of the trial court was 
affirmed on appeal. Plaintiff then commenced an action 
to recover on said supersedeas bond. The plaintiff took 
the position that the proper measure of recovery was the 
rents and profits collected from the land. The court 
held th_at even though the supersedeas bond was not con-
ditioned exactly within the terms of the Oklahoma statute 
(which is similar to Section 104-41-11, U.C.A. 1943) the 
terms of the bond governed. In other words, the Court 
in the Amberg v. Claussen case held that the measure of 
liability where stay of execution is had after the filing 
of a supersedeas bond, is limited to the terms of the bond 
itself. Surely, it would in any event be limited to either 
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the terms of the bond or the measure of liability set forth 
in the statute. (See Section 104-41-11, U.C.A. 1943). 
Respecting the question as to ""hether or not defend-
ant's possession, after the entry of the decree, was 
wrongful the Court held : 
''Defendant, in a strict sense, 'vas not, after 
the filing of said bond, wrongfully occupying· the 
land. He had a right to occupy and continue in 
possession, not because he was the owner or had 
the lawful right to occupy the land before giving · 
the bond, but because the law gave him that right. 
By this bond, in the nature of a contract, he ac-
quired the right, by reason of the promise of de-
fendants, in the bond, to pay for the privilege, in 
case the judgment_ against him for possession 
should be affirmed. '' 
Throughout his brief, plaintiff 1n the case at bar 
takes the position that the defendant's possession, after 
.the entry of the decree quieting title and until the deci-
sion on appeal, was wrongful; defendant insists it was 
rightful; that the right was given him under the statute; 
that the sole remedy of plaintiff is on the bond, and his 
limit of liability is the amount of the bond. 
How can defendant's possession, after the entry of 
the decree quieting title, be wrongful when it is u~der a 
Court order giving him the right to maintain possession 
after the entry of the decree~ As we view it, defendant 
was entitled to appeal from the decree quieting title as a 
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matter of right (there is no suggestion that the appeal 
was without merit); the statute gives him the right to 
remain in possession pending the appeal under a stay of 
execution, upon furnishing a supersedeas bond, and the 
statute states the measure of damages. Surely it cannot 
be argued that a defendant is 'vrongfully in possession if 
he is in possession under the Court's stay of execution, 
the stay of execution giving him the legal right to remain 
in possession. 
What is the liability under the statute and the bonds 
in this case' The statute in Utah heretofore cited and 
the bonds in this case fix the defendant's liability "to the 
effect that during the possession of such property by the 
appellant he will not commit, or suffer to be committed, 
any waste thereon, and that if the judgment is affirmed 
or the appeal dismissed, he will pay the value of the use 
and occ11-pancy of the property from the time of the appeal 
until the delivery of the possession thereof and for any 
"\\Taste committed thereon pursuant to the judgment or 
order, not exceeding a s1tm to be fixed by the Judge of 
the Court by which the judgment was rendered or order 
made, and which must be specified in the undertaking.'' 
Plaintiff introduced no proof whatever respecting 
the measure of damages to which he was entitled under 
the statute and the bond, and the trial court could not do 
otherwise than find: 
''That the plan tiff has presented to this court 
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no competent proof 'Ylu1 teYer of damages to which 
plaintiff claims to be entitled, and that the sole evi-
d~nce and proof pertaining to or respecting dam-
ages claimed by plaintiff is as set forth in findings 
Nos. 9 and 10 herein.'' (Finding No. 14, Record 
Page 50). 
Under such a finding plaintiff, having properly 
stated a cause of action, and there being no competent 
proof as to damages, 'Yas clearly entitled to a judgment 
for nominal damages. 
But even assuming the ph~intiff was not limited to 
the measure of damages fixed by the statute and bond, 
still under the authorities he is not entitled to recover the 
damages alleged and claimed by him. 
The trial court at ·one period in this litigation relied 
on the authorities cited in 17 C. J. 381, Section 7. 
''CROPS RAISED BY TRESPASSER. * * * 
But one who sows, cultivates, and harvests a crop 
upon the land of another is entitled to the crop as 
against the o"\vner of the land, whether he came to 
the possession of the land lawfully or not, provided 
he remains in possession till the crop is harvested.'' 
17 C. J. 381, Section 7. 
"CROP RAISED BY TRESPASSER. * * * 
On the other hand, one who sows, cultivates and 
harvests a crop on the land of another is entitled 
to the crop as against the owner of the land, wheth-
er he came to- the possession of the land lawfully 
or not, provided he remains in possession until the 
crop is harvested, but, if such person abandons pos-
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session of the land, or is dispossessed under a legal 
writ before the crop is matured and severed from 
the soil, it then becomes the property gf the owner 
of the land." 25 C.J.S Crops, Section 8. 
It cannot be contended that defendant did not sow, 
cultivate and harvest the crop of wheat in the case at bar, 
nor can it be contended that he abandoned possession or 
was dispossessed under a legal writ prior to severance. 
It seems under the authorities that this defendant be-
came the actual owner of the crop after severance and 
it is elementary that one cannot convert pers-onalty which 
he then owns. Far from being dispossessed under a legal 
writ prior to maturity, the only legal writ in this case 
(stay of execution) expressly gave defendant the right 
to possess. 
Yet even if defendant was a mere trespasser he be-· 
came the owner of crops when severed. He cannot be 
held liable for conversion of the crops, but he can be held 
liable for the value of use and occupation of the real es-
tate in the condition it was when the decree quieting title 
was entered by the trial court, and this would take into 
consideratiol) that the land had growing crops thereon. 
Defendant freely concedes that the value of the use and 
occupation of the land was enhanced by the growing 
crops. Still, this would not place title to the severed 
crops in the plaintiff, and defendant cannot be held liable 
for conversion. 
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Peacock v. B'radsha~o, 293 Pac. 982, is a case where 
defendant claimed title to land but an adverse decision 
was rendered by the trial court. Defendant furnished 
the statutory appeal bond and appealed to the Supreme 
C~urt. Decision "~as affirmed. The Supreme Court of 
Idaho ably reviews the dec_isions of various jurisdictions 
and we respectfully refer this Court to the entire opinion 
as being decisive in this case. In brief, the case holds, 
under facts similar to the case at bar, that: 
1. The o"rner of the land is not the owner of 
the severed crops ; 
2. The owner of land can recover the rents and 
profits; 
f 3. The above _is true even where possession is 
without any right whatever; 
4. The proper reme9-y is for wrongful with-
holding of possession, and not for the crop 
or the wrongful conversion of the crop. 
We quote the following_ most pertinent portions of 
the case because they reflect the universal holdings of 
all Courts in the Western jurisdictions : 
'' rrhe Washington court in Fuglede v. W enat-
chee Dist. Co-op. Ass 'n., 134 Wash. 350, 235 P. 790> 
792, 39 A.L.R 953, recently examined the law rela-
tive to property rights in severed crops as between 
a claimant wrongfully in possession, while the 
crops were grown and severed, and one who was en-
titled to possession but out of possession until 
after the crops were severed. The Fuglede action 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18. 
was not for the landlord's portion, nor did it .in-
volve the whole crop. It involved a balance of crop 
proceeds after deducting advancements to the 
actual grower for groV\ring and harvesting. After 
exhaustively examining and discussing the author-
ities, that court adopted the rule announced in Page 
v. Fowler, 39 (jal. 412, 2 .. A.m. Rep. 462, as follows: 
'It is undoubtedly true that, at common law, a per-
son who had been ouHted from land might, after a 
recovery and re-entry, maintain his action of tress-
pass for the mesne profits and for waste for the 
reason that after re-entry the law supposes he has 
al\\Tav-s been seized and the acts of the defendant 
\vcre a continuous tresspass upon the rightful pos-
session of the plaintiff; but· no case has been cited 
in which this principle has been held to make the 
owner of the land out of possession, under such 
circumstances, the o'vner of the crops grown and 
actually harvested by the defendant. The very fact 
that he 1nay recorer the rents and profits· of the 
land, shotos that he cannot recorer the crops.**'" 
''Later in the opinion the court quoted from 
the case of Brothers v. Hurdle, 32 N. C. 490, 51 Am. 
Dec. 400; as folloV\rs : 'But when one V{ho is in the 
adverse possession gathers a crop in the course of 
husbandry, or scycrs a tree or other thing from 
the land, the thing SeYCred becomes a chattel, but 
it does not become the property of the o'vner of 
the land; for ,his title is divested--he is out of pos-. 
session, and has no ·right to the immediate posses-
sion of the thing,. nor could he bring any action 
until he regains possession. * * * The otDner of the 
la·nd cannot sue for th f' thing· serered in trorer or 
detinue as a chatt~l; for it is not his chattfJl-it did 
not b~come so at the tim.e it tuas serer'ed, and the 
title to it as a chattel ranunt pass to hhn aftf'r1unril~ 
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lthen he rcgaius the possessiou, or by force of the 
jus postliJni,Jrii.' " 
''The :!\fontana Co~1rt, in }(ester Y. Amon, 81 
:Jiont. 1, 261 P. ~88, 29~, citing Fuglede v. Wenat-
chee Co-op.. ..:-\..ss 'n., supra, announced tl;l.e rule as 
follo"~s: · 'fhe o'vnership of crops raised on land 
held adYerst~ly dops not·depend npon the ownership 
of the land, or the right to the possession thereof, 
but upon 'vho "ras in the actual physical possession, 
and o'vnership and th_e right to -possession are not 
in issue in an action involving the o'vnership of the 
crops.· '' 
~ '\V"'" e think the Idaho court has disposed of the 
question inYolved, in Fritcher v. Kelley, 34 Idaho 
4G8, 201 P. 1037. That case, like the case at bar, 
'Yas the outgrowth of a case 'vherein a deed had 
been canceled. In Fritcher Y. ICelley, the deed had 
been canceled on the groun!l of mental incompe-
tency. The action 'vas against both ~he grantee _in 
the deed and the crop tenant to restrain the remov-
ing of a crop that had been severed. Relief was 
denied agaiust either the landlord or tenant, the 
court stating in the opinion: 'Appellant claims 
that the crops were part of the realty and as such 
belonged to him. They "rere all fructus industri-
ales; _that is, crops produced by labor and industry. 
\V e> approve the rule that fructus industriales be-
long to one "rho, while in possession of the land, 
has raised them and se\''ered them from the land 
itself, though it turn out that -his possession was 
'"'ithout right as against the true owner of the land. 
* * * TV e conr.Zude that this -rule holds good, even 
as to that part o.f the crops ~vhi,ch 1vere not severed 
br.fnrf fhf jud[Jr;nent, so long as they were severed 
'1f'h il e respondents 1re rr i11 pnssr ssi on o .f the land.' " 
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"(2 3) rrhe rule is quite universal that as 
between' one out of possession, though the owner, 
and entitled to possession, and one adversely in 
possession, while crops are grown and severed, the 
title to the entire crop is in the latter. Fritcher v. 
Kelley, supra; !{ester v. Amon, supra; Fuglede v. 
Wenatchee Co-op~ Ass 'n., supra; Grossman v. Yip 
Wing, 62 Cal. App. 121, 216 P. 634; Rector v. Lewis, 
46 Cal. App. 168, 188 P. 1018; Rathbone v. Boyd, 
30 Kan. 485, 2 P. 664; Phillips v. Keysaw, 7 Okl. 
67 4, 56 P. 695; Gross v. Robinson, 36 Wyo. 392, 256 
P. 80, 57 A.L.R. 578. The authorities quite as gen-
erally recognize a remedy, but it is always for the 
wrongful withholding of possession; never for the 
crop or wrongful conversion of the crop in which 
the landowner had no title. Gross v. Robinson, 
supra; Grossman v. Yip Wing, supra; Pennybecker 
v. McDougal, 46 Cal. 661; Page v. Fowler, 39 Cal. 
· 412, 2 Am. Rep. 462; Groome v. Almstead, 101 Cal. 
425, 35 P. 1021; Stockwell v. Phelps, 34 N. Y. 363, 
90 Am. Dec. 710. '' 
The plaintiff respectfully refers the Court to the 
many cases cited in the Peacock v. Bradshaw case. 
Kester v. Amon, 261 Pac. 288, is identical in principle 
with the case at bar and we quote pertinent portions from 
that case: 
6. Analagous to the above principle is the 
rule that 'where a mere intruder upon lands plants 
crops thereon, such crops, as long as they remain 
unsevered, are the property of the owner of the 
land.' 17 C.J. 381, and cases cited. But-
"7. In either case the sub modo ownership 
may be defeated by the planter of the crops har-
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vesting them, 'vhen ripe, and thus appropriating 
to himself, as owner, that which he planted and cul-
tivated. Power ~lerc. Co. v. Moore Mere. Co., 
above. 
"(5) 8. A corollary to the above principles is 
the doctrine, of almost universal application, that 
when an occupant of lands plants, cultivates, and 
harYests crops during the term of his occupation, 
they are his personal property, 'vhether he occu-
pied the land as a purchaser' a tenant, or a mere 
trespasser holding the land adversely to the real 
owner, and whether he came into the possession of 
the land lawfully or not, provided he remain in pos-
session until after the crops are harvested. 17 C.J. 
381 ; Shamlian v. Wells, 197 Cal. 716, 242 P. 483 ; 
Lynch v. Sprague Roller Mills Co., 51 Wash. 535~ 
99 P. 578; Smith v. Howell, 91 Or. 279, 176 P. 805; 
Story v. Lang, 87 Kan. 727, 125 P. 72; First Nat. 
Bank v. Montana Emporium Co., 59 Mont. 584, 197 
P. 994." 
''The fact that the statute declares that the 
owner may recover the value of the use and occupa-
tion of his land precludes the idea of his right to 
recover the crops or their value, which include, not 
only the value of the use of the land, but also the 
value of the seed planted and the time and labor of 
the one who plants and cultivates the land. Wood-
cock v. Carlson, 41 1\Iinn. 542, 43 N. W. 479; Stock-
well v. Phelps, 34 N. Y. 363, 90 Am.- Dec. 710; John-
son v. Fish, 105 Cal. 420, 38 P. 979, 45 Am. St. Rep. 
53; Groome v. Olmstead, 101 Cal. 425, 35 P. 1021.'' 
Rector v. Le1vis, 188 Pac. 1018, is a case where the 
Court expressly stated that: 
The legal question presented is whether de-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
fendants can recover as damages for the use and 
·occupation of their land during the time it was law-
fully detained by the plantiff the gross value of the 
crop raised thereon by plaintiff. It is insisted by 
appellant that in no event could the recovery be 
for more than the value after deducting the cost of 
growing and harvesting the crop, and that the true 
measure of damages is not the crops grown on the 
land, but the rental value of the premises.'' 
The Court, in Rector v. Lewis case, held that the 
crops harvested by one in unlawful possession belonged 
to him, and ''the owner's remedy is to recover the rental 
value of the land.'' Can it be said that the liability of one 
rightfully in possession under a stay of execution would 
be greater than the liability of one in unlawful posses-
sion 1 In the case at bar the rental value would be predi-
cated upon the land with growing crops thereon to which 
this plaintiff was entitled under the decree quieting title. 
"If Zahar had entered upon said land and 
harvested the crop on his own account, he would 
have been entitled to the harvested crop, for it is 
well settled that the owner of ·land has no right or 
title to crops raised on the land by one not in privity 
with him and severed 'vhile he is out of possession. 
Rector v. Lewis, 46 Cal. -App. 168, 188 P. 1018; Be-
thea v. J effe-ts, 12·6 Ark. 194, 189 S. W. 666; L.R.A. 
1918A, 549, p52, and note; 8 R~ C. L. 366; 8 Cal. 
Jur~ 688. But coincident with his right to retain 
the severed crops is his Iiabili ty to the owner for 
damages, the measure of which is the value of the 
use and possession of the land while he was in pos-
session. Page v. Fowler, 39 Cal. 412, citing Page 
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Y. Fowler, 37 Cal. 100; Groome v. Alm~tead, 101 
Cal. 425, 35 P. 1021; Johnson v. Fish, 105 Cal. 420, 
38 P. 979, 45 Am. St. Rep. 53; Rector v. Lewis, 
supra, 168; 8 Cal. Jr. 689." Shamlian v. Wells, 242 
Pac. 483. 
See also J oh11son v. P1ish, 38 Pac. 979, and· Lynch v. 
Sprague !loller J.llills, 99 Pac. 578. 
Whether this Court "\vould hold, if the question were 
before it, that the defendant is liable for the use and occu-
pation of the premises, limited to the ·amount of the super-
sedeas bond, w·hich is the holding in the Amberg v. Claus-
sen case, or that the defendant is liable for use and occu-
pation 'vithout the limitation of the supersedeas bond, 
need not be now determined. But. it is readily apparent 
that without exception the. courts of the Pacific jurisdic-
tion universally hold that in cases identical in principle 
with the case at bar the plaintiff cannot recover the high-
est fluctuating peak or market .value of the severed crops 
in an action for conversion; that the plaintiff is not the 
O"\vner of the severed crops; that ownership of and title 
to the severed crops are in the defendant. 
Parenthetically, defendant observes that even though 
defendant might be liable for conver~ion of growing 
crops, and if he were liable at all in conversion it would 
be of growing and not severed crops, the measure of dam-
ages is properly stated thusly: 
''In an action in conversion involving a crop of 
growing g·rain. the jury should be given the q1eas-
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ure of damages, and evidence should be required 
as to the cost of putting such crop in shape for 
market." Ilazelwood v. Jenkins, 205 Pac. 1038, 
syl. 2. 
THE TRIAI.J COURT PROPERLY AWARDED 
JUDGl\IENT FOR NOl\IINAL DAMAGES AGAINST 
J. GEORG·E JONES, JR. 
The only proof of damages shown by the. record is 
well stated in Finding No. 10 (Record Page 48) of the 
trial court, as follows: 
''That. said crop of wheat had a fluctuating 
market value; that said crop had a peak or high 
market value of $2.55 per pushel, or a total value 
of $6,078.38, on or about the 24th day of January, 
1948. '' 
The trial court also found (Finding No. 14, Record 
Page 50): 
''That the plaintiff has presented to this court 
no competent proof whatever of damages to which 
plaintiff claims to be entitled, and that the sole evi-
dence and proof pertaining to or respecting dam-
ages claimed by plaintiff is. as set forth in findings 
Nos. 9 and 10 herein." 
Defendant has previously shoWn that the highest 
peak or market value of the crop was not and is not the 
correct legal measure of damages. 
Under such circumstances it is the universal rule~ 
and one followed by this Court, that: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
·'There being no adequate or competent evi-
dence to support the judgment for damages, a 
judgment for no more than nominal damages can 
be sustained. The legal right 'of respondent hav-
ing· been infringed upon by appellant the law pre-
sumes damages, but since the -amount of actual 
damages is not shown by competent evidence a 
judgment for $1 nominal damages is all that may 
be sustained. The decree should be amended in this 
particular.'' Bigler v. Fryer, 82 Utah 380, 25 Pac. 
( 2d) 598, 601. 
''As noted in Section 6 supra, a presumption 
of at least nominal damages follows from proof of 
a legal wrong. However, the amount and items of 
pecuniary damage are not presumed, but must be 
proved; and if there is no evidence as to the extent 
of the pecuniary loss there can be no recovery of 
substantial damages, at least where the elements 
of damage are such as to be susceptible of pecun-
iary admeasurement. The burden of proving the 
fact and amount of pecuniary damage is on the 
party asserting the damage, particularly in the 
ca~e of damages which are uncertain or have not 
been admitted; and such party, has the burden of 
showing his damages by evidence which is compe-
tent and which furnishes a basis for their assess-
ment in accordance with the -measure of damages 
properly applicable.'' 25 C .• J.S. Damages, Section 
144, Page 788. 
~ee also· 17 C. J. 1023. 
"ABSENCE OF PROOF AS TO ACTUAL 
DAMAGES. 
Nominal damages may be recovered where a 
cause of action for a legal wrong is established, 
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but there is no proof of actual damages. 
Although the law presumes damage from the 
infringem~nt of a legal right, as stated supra Sec-
tion 6, the amount of damage so presumed is only 
nominal; hence, as· stated in Corpus Juris, which 
has been quoted with approval, where a legal 
wrong is established but there is no_ evidence as to 
actual darnages, nominal damages are properly 
awarded. In other words, where plaintiff estab-
l,ishes a cause of action but fails to show any dam-
age, he rnay recover nominal damages." 25 C.J.S. 
Damages, Section 9, page 466. 
''Where plaintiff establishes a wrong and 
actual loss therefrom he is entitled to nominal dam-
ages at least, although the actual damages are not 
susceptible of being exactly ascertained, as where 
the evidence fails to show the extent of the result-
ing damages, or fails to furnish the facts as a basis 
for computing the damages under the rule applic-
able thereto; * * * '' 25 C.J .S. Damages, Section 
12, Page 469. 
''ACTUAL DA1\1:AGE UNCERTAIN OR UN-
ASCERTAINABI.~E. \Vhere plaintiff establishes 
a wrong and actual loss therefrom he is entitled to 
nominal damages at least, although the actual dam--
ages are not susceptible of being exactly·· ascer-
tained, or are so small that they cannot readily be 
estimated. In such cases if plaintiff evidently has 
sustained some damage and the jury being unable 
to ascertain the amount finds a verdict for defend-
ant, the court will permit plaintiff to enter a ver-
dict for nominal damages. As a corollary to this 
rule, where it is sho,vn that plaintiff has suffered 
damages but fr~m the nature of the case they can- _ 
not be shown with reasonable cert~inty, only nom-
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inal damages are recoYerable. '' 17 C.J. Section 
·61, Page 725. 
Woods v. Ft. Smith & Tlr. Ry. (~o. et al., 219 Pac. 650, 
is a case flatly in point respecting the point that plaintiff 
was entitled to and should haYe been awarded nominal 
damages. The syllabus (No. 1) succinctly states the law: 
''In an action on tort, \Yhere a breach of duty 
1s sho\Yn and the amount of the resulting injury 
is not sho,v-n, the plaintiff is entitled to recover 
nominal damages, and it is error to sustain a de-
murrer to the plaintiff's evidence because the testi-
mony is insufficient to show the amount of the 
damages sustained. ' ' 
The Court in its opinion said: 
''There was evidence in the record showing 
that the growing crops belonging to_ the plaintiff 
were destroyed by the overflow, and, while the tes-
timony sho,vs that the land was farmed by tenants, 
it fails to show except in one instance what portion 
of the growing crops belonged to the landlord and 
what portion belonged to the tenant, and, while 
there was not sufficient evidence from which the 
jury could have properly ascertained the actual 
damages sustained by the plaintiff to his growing 
crops, we are of the opinion that it was error for 
the court to sustain- a demurrer to plaintiff's evi-
dence. There was evidence tending to show negli-
gence on the part of defendant, and there was 
evidence sho,ving that by reason thereof the plain-
tiff had been damaged. In these circumstances, upon 
the failure of the plaintiff to introduce evidence 
front ~vhirh the ,jury could determine the amount 
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of the damages,· plaintiff was entitled to recover 
nominal damages. The plaintiff was entitled to 
recover for the destruction of the growing crops 
the value of his portion of such crops in the condi-
tion in which they were at the time of the destruc-
tion, and, before a recovery of actual damages 
wou.ld have been justified, it would have been 
necessary for the plaintiff to prove what portion 
of the crop belonged to him and to have introduced 
some evidence from which the value of-the crop in 
its condition at the time of the destruction could 
have been determined." 
In vVoods v. Ft. Smith case the plaintiff recovered 
nothing, and it was reversed o~ appeal, it being held that 
nominal damages should have been awarded. This is true 
because: 
''Some damages are always presumed 'to fol-
low from violation of _any right of duty implied by 
law, which will award nominal damages in such 
cases, if none greater are proved~'' Smith v. Pallay, 
279 Pac. 279. 
In Call v. Coiner, 251 Pac. 617, identical in principle 
with the case at bar, evidence as to the correct measure 
of damages was wholly lacking. The jury awarded nom-
inal damages only and this award was upheld on appeal. 
The Court held : 
''The jury either had to guess blindly or award 
nominal damages, which latter they logically· did." 
That is exactly the situation in the case at bar. 
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'vhich the trial court could ascertain the amount of dam-
ages to "\Yhich plaintiff might be legally entitled. The 
trial court would have been compelled to guess blindly, 
or a,, ... ard the nominal ·damages which he prope~ly 
a'varded. 
See also JlcGztire r. TV'hite, 11 Pac. (2d) 698, and 
Franklin v. Shure, 237 Pac. 461. 
ANS\v'ER TO PL~t\.INTIFF 'S CONTENTION 
THAT "POSSESSION OF PREl\1ISES BY DEFEND-
ANTS AT TI~IE CROP WAS IIARVESTED IMMA-
TERIAL AS DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS AND CLAil\I 
IN CROP WERE RES ADJUDICATA." 
Plaintiff insists that the defendants' rights in the 
crop of wheat were res adjudicata. This might perhaps 
be more correct if Vire added the word ''growing'' so that 
he were contending that the defendants' rights in the 
crop of growing wheat were res adjudicata. All that the 
decree quieting title settled was the plaintiff's ownership 
and right to possession of land with growing crops there-
on. As we have previously noted in the brief, under the 
case of Antberg v. Claussen, supra, defendant had a right 
to possession of the premises with·· the growing crop 
thereon when he furnished a supersedeas bond and the 
court made and entered a stay of execution. Under all 
of the authorities heretofore cited, when the crops were 
grown and severed title 'vas in the defendants, and plain-
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tiff was relegated to damages for the use and occupation 
of the land. Whether the .amount of such damages could 
exceed the amount of the supersedeas bond we need not 
here determine. 
The authorities cited by the plaintiff go to the gen-
eral proposition that where the subject matter is within 
the scope of the action and relevant to the issues, the 
matter is res adjudicata. This we concede, and we read-
ily concede further that plaintiff's ~ight and title to the 
growing crops thereon was and is res adjudicata. How-
ever, the case at bar involves and effects the rights of the 
parties under facts and sitttations arising after the entry 
of the de-cree and which could not be and were not adjudi-
cated in the previous action to quiet title. 
Defendant believes his previous argument and 
authorities covers the situation, and several cases cited 
by the defendant are identical in principle with the situa-
- tion before this Court. 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S . CONTENTION 
THAT "POSSESSION OF PREMISES AT TIME 
CROP HARVESTED IMMATERIAL AS DEFEND-
ANTS RIGHTS AND CLAIMS IN CROP WERE 
BARR·ED BY STATUTE." 
Defendants believe that this argument of the plain-
tiff is identical with the .contention of plaintiff that de-
fendants' rights in th~ crop are res adjudicata. In that 
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eYent "·hat "'"e said in ans" .. er to such argument will suf-
fice here. 
If the argument of the plaintiff under this subhead 
does not encompass the matter of res adjudicata, then 
frankly, defendants do not know or understand what the 
plaintiff is talking· about or driYing· at . 
. A.XS'\TER TO PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTION 
THAT "POSSESSION OF PREMISES BY DEFEND-
ANTS AT TIME CROP HARVESTED IMMATERIAL 
.A_S DEFEXD.A_NTS' RIG·HTS AND CLAI!1S IN CROP 
WERE LOST AND BARRED BY PLAINTIFF'S 
TAKING POSSESSION O:B-, PREMISES WHILE 
CROP GROWING THEREON .. " 
The matters respecting plai:utiff's re-entry are bet-
ter set forth, without interpretation of the parties, in the 
trial court's · Finding No. 8 (Record _Page 48) than the 
plaintiff sets them out with his own peculiar and slanted 
interpretation. 
It will be observed that the plaintiff's actions on said 
land, which we hardly consider a legal entry, was with-
out any writ of possession or any other legal right ~hat­
ever, and in the temporary absence of the defendants or 
any legal representatives of the defendants. It was also 
between the time when the decree quieting title was en-
tered and the statutory time within which defendant 
might apply for a stay of execution and furnish a super-
sedeas bond. 
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If such an entry would change the status of the par-
ties it would render nugatory the provisions of Section 
104-41-11, U. C. A. 1943, and would make it necessary 
during such period to guard the property day and night 
to prevent the prevailing party from taking possession 
during the temporary absence of the los_ing party. This 
we cannot believe is the law. 
and his representatives was wrongful. Paxton v. Dear-
and his representatives was wrongful Paxton v .. Dear-
den, 94 Utah 149, 76 Pac. (2d) 561). The defendants had 
the right of possession under the stay of execution which 
awarded that right to the defendants, and regardless of 
what caused the plaintiff not to press his- claim to pos-
session, the fact remains he would have been and could 
have been evicted under the stay of execution. 
ANSWER TO PL.AINTIFF 'S CONTENTION 
THAT "EFFECT O:B., SlJPERSEDEAS BOND IS 
SOLELY TO STAY ENFORCEMENT OF JUD~ 
MENT AND DOES NOT NULLIFY, VOID OR SUS-
PEND THE JUDG]\1ENT.'' 
Once again the plaintiff's argument leaves the de-
fendants in doubt as to what he is talking about. Cer-
tainly the defendants do not understand the application 
of the argument to the cas~ ~t bar. 
It may be that what plaintiff intends to argue again 
revolves around his ·oft~repeated contention th~t the title 
and right of the parties in the crop are res adjudicata~ 
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but if this be so defendants again observe that the decree 
quieting title did not adjudicate the rights of the parties 
to the seYered crops after they had been cultivated to 
maturity, harvested and sold, all acts arising after the 
entry of the decree and 'vhile the defendants were legally 
in possession of the premises and the growing crops 
thereon under a stay of execution. 
AN"SWER TO PL ... ~INTIFF'S CONTENTION 
THAT "ACTION IN TROVER FOR CONVERSION 
OR IX X.A.TURE OF ACTION ON THE CASE." 
In this portion of his argument, plaintiff again pre-
supposes that he was and is the owner of the severed 
crop, which is not the fact and contrary to the authorities. 
Defendants further call this Court's attention to the 
fact that under such authorities previously cited we find 
that title to severed crops vested in the defendants upon 
severance, and it is elementary that conversion does not 
lie for appropriation of and dominion over one's own 
property. 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTION 
THAT "DISPOSAL OF SUBJECT OF ACTION 
PENDING APPEAL IS CONTEMPT OF BOTH 
TRIAL AND APPELL-6-~TE COURTS.'' 
Defendants might find much to argue about if they 
were before this court charged with contempt. Since such 
a proceeding or matter is not before this Court - since the 
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to be said ·further. 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTION 
TH1\T "AWARD OF NOMINAL DAMAGES ERRON-
EOUS WHERE PLAINTIFF CLEARLY ENTITLED 
TO SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES.'' 
Plaintiff argues that ''in the case at bar it is clearly 
established that plaintiff was and is entitled to be com-· 
pensated for the crop of grain * * *" and that such com-
pensation should be for the high market value of the 
wheat.'' 
He presupposes that he is entitled to such damages, 
and that was the very matter before the t:rial court ·and 
the very matter to be determined .by this Court. Defend-
ants have heretofore arg·ued and cited authorities to the 
effect that the highest fluctuating market value of the 
wheat is not the proper measure of damages, and that 
, 
there was and is no competent evidence showing that 
plaintiff is entitled to recover anything. We refer this 
Court to our main argument, and will refrain from need-
less repetition here. 
ANSWER TO PIJAINTIFF'S CONTENTION 
THAT ''PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO EXEMPLARY 
DAMAGES BY REASON OF THE "\VILLFUL, WAN-
TON, MALICIOUS AND WRONGFUL NATURE OF 
DEF]JNDANTS' ACTION.'' 
The plaintiff again presupposes and states as a fact 
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that the defendants' nctions "~ere willful, wanton, mali-
cious and wrongful. This is contrary to the trial court's 
Finding of Fact No. 13 (Record Page No. 49), said find-
ing being as follo"\YS : 
"'That the defendant J. George J'ones, Jr. was 
and is not guilty of any evil motive or malicious 
conduct either in pursuing his appeal to the Su~ 
preme Court as aforesaid, or in procuring a stay 
of execution, or in remaining in possession of said 
premises pending such appeal, or- in the harvesting 
and disposal of said crop of grain.'' 
Defendants are willing to rest on the authorities 
cited by plaintiff in this regard, to which they add the 
following· authorities : 
25 C. J. S. Damages, Sec. 119, Page 715. 
25 C. J. S. Damages, Sec. 123 (sub "b"), Page 
722. 
It seems rather obvious, aside from the findings of 
the trial court, that plaintiff negatives the idea of exemp-
lary damages when he admits and the record shows the 
defendants remained in possession under a stay of exe-
cution which gave them that right. 
CONCLUSION 
His lack of competent proof as to damages did not 
take the plaintiff by surprise. He had ample advance 
notice of the law of the case, the views of the trial court, 
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and even the views of this Court. Everything that is here 
stated was said to this Court and admitted by the plain-
tiff at an argument on an appeal which was taken by the 
plaintiff from an order of the trial court sustaining a 
demurrer to the plaintiff's amended complaint. We be-
lieve that facts stated and admitted before this very 
Court are matters of which this Court may take cogniz-
ance and are matters which may be stated in this brief. 
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the amended 
complaint stating in said order, among other matters, the 
following: 
'' * * * the court having duly considered the 
same and being of the opinion that said amended 
complaint does not state facts sufficient to consti-
tute a cause of action except for nominal damages 
* * *." (Record Page 32). 
The appeal of plaintiff from that order is not re-
ported, since the case was merely remanded to the trial 
court. Day v. Jones, No. 7288. (Record Page No. 38). 
At the argument on that demurrer the trial court 
suggested to plaintiff that if he felt he was entitled to 
damages in the amount of the highest peak value of the 
wheat, he should file an amended complaint incorporat-
ing a second cause of action with allegations respecting 
the measure of damages which defendants felt plaintiff 
might be entitled and which the trial court felt was the 
proper measure of damages. Rather than file an amend-
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ed complaint following such suggestion he appealed, and 
the cause 'Yas remanded as stated. 
At the lengthy and informal arg·ument before this 
Court in chambers on that appeal, two members of this 
Yery Court suggested to the plaintiff that he do the very 
thing the trjal court advised. Despite the fact that the 
trial court and this Court 'vent to great lengths in mak-
ing such sugg·estions the plaintiff 'vould not ·follow them, 
but on the contrary 'vent to trial upon the theory that he 
''as entitled to the highest peak value of the wheat, a~d 
" ... as entitled to exemplary damages, and not one whit 
less; that he was not going to be_ content with any smaller 
and legal measure of damages. 
Under such circumstances plaintiff cannot say that 
he was ignorant of the proper measure of damages; that 
he was not apprised of the holdings of the authorities; 
that he was not afforded more than ample opportunity 
to recover what he was entitled to recover. 
The trial court held that he was not entitled to the 
highest peak value of the crop of wheat, and that in the 
absence of any competent proof of damages he wa·s en-
titled to nominal damages and no more. Defendants 
urge that under the circumstances the trial court's ruling 
dismissing the action as to Mrs. J. George Jones, Jr. and 
awarding plaintiff nominal damages against J. George 
Jones, Jr. was correct, and no other judgment could pos-
sibly have been entered. 
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For the reasons in this brief set forth the judgment 
of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINE, wILSON & CLINE, 
J ttorn,eys tor Defendants 
and Respondents. 
I I 
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